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A DeADLy CONSeNSUS1
Worker Safety and Regulatory Degradation under New Labour
Steve Tombs* and David Whyte
This paper documents the vulnerability of the UK workplace safety regime to ‘regulatory degradation’. 
Following a brief overview of this regime, the paper examines the dominant arguments within 
academic literature on appropriate and feasible regulatory enforcement, arguing that the approaches 
to regulation thereby advocated have been easily degraded as a result of their compatibility with neo-
liberal economic strategy. A subsequent analysis of empirical trends within safety enforcement reveals 
a virtual collapse of formal enforcement, as political and resource pressures have taken their toll on 
the regulatory authority. Finally, the paper indicates that the increasing impunity with which 
employers can kill and injure is particularly problematic as we enter sustained economic recession, 
and underlines the urgent need for regulatory alternatives.
Keywords: safety crimes, regulation, deregulation, enforcement, health and safety, neo-
liberalism, risk
Introduction
The near collapse of banking systems and the ongoing economic crises across the globe 
have called into question some of the mantras of neo-liberalism regarding the most 
appropriate and feasible forms of regulating business activity. In particular, the current 
crisis highlights the unsustainability of any set of politico-economic arrangements in 
which states actually attempt to do as neo-liberal ideology claims they should do—to 
withdraw from what is in fact a necessary role of states, namely regulation.
The focus of this paper is with the neo-liberal assault upon the regulatory structure 
governing worker safety in the United Kingdom. In some respects, this article follows on 
from a debate within the pages of this journal (Hawkins 1990; 1991; Pearce and Tombs 
1990; 1991). Through its discussion of regulatory trends—in discursive, policy and 
practical terms—over a 15+ year period, it develops the critique of the ‘compliance 
school’, set out in that debate, though does not re-enter the details of that debate nor 
wider reactions to it (see, e.g. Gray 2006; Hopkins 1994; Johnstone 1999).
We argue here that the (pluralist) philosophy underpinning the UK system of safety 
regulation is based upon a set of unsupported assumptions that render the system highly 
vulnerable to a process of regulatory degradation. After exploring how this philosophy 
has facilitated the rise to dominance of a neo-liberal regulatory strategy, the paper then 
moves to a more focused analysis of empirical trends within safety enforcement in the 
* Professor of Sociology, School of Social Science, Liverpool John Moores University, Clarence Street, Liverpool, L3 5UG, UK; 
s.p.tombs@ljmu.ac.uk.
1 This title owes an acknowledgment to Dalton’s (2000) phrase ‘consensus kills’.
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United Kingdom over a 12-year period.2 This period, incorporating as it does the first 11 
years of Labour government, is perhaps the key period in which the Thatcherite claim 
to there being ‘no alternative’ to neo-liberal capitalism was consolidated.
‘Consensus’ and the Potential for Regulatory Degradation
The principle of ‘common interest’—the key idea in which the Western liberal tradition 
of social regulation is embedded, discernible in early forms of social regulation in the 
nineteenth century (Tucker 1995)—is that which formally underpins the UK Health 
and Safety at Work Act (HSWAct) 1974. Thus, over 30 years ago, reviewing the existing 
state of occupational safety and health legislation in the United Kingdom, the Robens 
Committee that safety is an area in which there is a far greater ‘identity of interests’ 
between the ‘two sides’ of industry than other aspects of workplace relations. Concluding 
that the ‘primary responsibility’ for improving occupational safety lay ‘with those who 
create the risks and those who work with them’ (Robens 1972: 152), the Robens 
Committee urged the establishment of a ‘more effectively self-regulating system’ 
(Robens 1972: 152). Robens’ recommendations concerning the nature of this self-
regulating system were formalized in the subsequent HSWAct, and later provided a 
model for occupational safety legislation in Canada and a number of Australian states.
The self-regulatory philosophy of Robens and subsequent UK safety law did recognize 
non-compliance with safety regulations, and the possible need to force this upon 
employers. This pressurizing role was assigned to trades unions within the workplace 
and to regulators as a source of external pressure. Thus, this tripartite system of 
regulation is necessarily vulnerable to degradation if any of its partners is unable to fulfil the 
role that is assumed to it—so that in the absence of external enforcement or internal 
pressure from organized labour, it is liable to descend into either a form of de facto 
deregulation (Tombs 1996) or a form of regulation based upon ‘market’ mechanisms.
The emerging academic interest around questions of regulatory enforcement that 
followed the rolling out of social regulation from the 1970s onwards tended to reflect 
Robens’ assumptions regarding a basic ‘common interest’. Thus, the dominant strand 
of studies on regulation has been a range of works, focusing across business sectors 
and discrete areas of legislation, which documents the extent to which the compliance-
oriented approach3 is the predominant one amongst regulatory bodies. Some have 
argued since that there is a generalized convergence across enforcement bodies, 
jurisdictions, bodies of law and so on, towards a compliance-oriented enforcement 
approach (Hutter 1997: 243; see also Sparrow 1994; Braithwaite 2000: 99–106; Braithwaite 
1987).
An intimately related body of literature on regulation, associated in particular with 
Braithwaite and various colleagues, makes the claim that appropriate enforcement is 
always a combination of techniques or a ‘regulatory mix’. Self-regulation is prescribed 
upon a ‘carrot and stick’ basis: where self-regulation proves ineffective, the next 
2 It does so by using, for the most part, publicly available data, both quantitative enforcement data produced by HSe, as well as a 
range of policy documents and statements regarding regulation in general and enforcement in particular, from government, HSe 
and various commentators upon safety enforcement activities.
3 See debate through the pages of the BJC at the start of the 1990s (Hawkins 1990; 1991; Pearce and Tombs 1990; 1991; also Pearce 
and Tombs 1998: 223–46).
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preferred regulatory tactic is ‘enforced self-regulation’, this requiring a company to 
develop a tailored set of rules by which it intends to comply with law which, once 
approved by external regulators, would then be ‘enforced’ internally; where evidence of 
non-compliance emerges, the potential of punitive external intervention remains 
(Braithwaite 2000: passim; Ayres and Braithwaite 1992: 102–16). Thus, deterrence is 
‘integrated into a strategy that tries persuasion first, then deterrence when that fails, 
then incapacitation where deterrence fails’ (Braithwaite 2000: 114).
A later variation on such an approach is twin- or two-track regulation, where regulatory 
interventions are targeted at the worst offenders, through a risk-based approach to 
targeting necessarily inadequate regulatory resources. Firms are offered a choice—
between ‘traditional’ (track one) regulation, or the adoption of a safety management 
system (track two). The latter in particular focuses upon performance and principle-
based approaches rather than prescribed specification standards, and places the onus 
for determining compliance and how to achieve it upon employers and workers—subject 
to third-party, though not necessarily state-based, oversight. Incentives play a key role 
within each regulatory strategy (for a key critical discussion, see Davis 2004).
More recently, an increasingly dominant set of voices regarding regulatory policy and 
enforcement has coalesced around the eSRC Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation 
(CARR)4 within the LSe. Thus, CARR ‘has rapidly established itself as an international 
reference point’5 for ‘risk regulation studies’—and what is particularly of interest for us 
is the very couplet ‘risk-regulation’. For here are the simultaneous ideas that risk is 
ubiquitous, that regulation always needs to be balanced against risk and that determining 
this balance is not necessarily, or even, the task of government or regulatory agencies 
per se (Hutter and Jones 2006). Thus, ‘Risk regulation refers to the governance, 
accountability and processing of risks, both within organizations as part of their risk 
management and compliance functions, and also at the level of regulatory and other 
agencies that constitute “risk regulation regimes”’.6 Regulation extends beyond and 
indeed is ‘de-centred’ from the state (Black 2002)—to various non-state bodies within 
the economic sphere, not least operating through market-based relationships, and 
through civil society (Hutter 2006). ‘At a minimum’, determining the risk-regulation 
balance ‘entails the use of technical risk-based tools, emerging out of economics (cost–
benefit approaches), and science, (risk assessment techniques)’ (Hutter 2005: 3, 
emphasis in original).
A further, common observation made by some academic commentators is that law in 
this area, in its ‘command-and-control’ forms, retains a key symbolic role, important, for 
example, in responses to multi-fatality disasters or high-profile work-related deaths 
(Almond 1997; 1999). And it is in this context that we can best understand the passage 
of the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, the key recent 
example of a ‘command-and-control’ state response to safety crimes in the United 
Kingdom. yet, closer scrutiny of this instance of ‘command and control’ underscores its 
exceptional nature. First, the Act is of interest precisely because it is an anomaly in the 
context of the more general trend away from state ‘command-and-control’ regulation. 
4 CARR was established in October 2000 with £2.5m eSRC funding, repeated in 2005 and furthered by hundreds of thousands of 
pounds of corporate donations from sources including AON, BP and Deutsche Bank.
5 www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CARR/aboutUs/Default.htm
6 Ibid.
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Second, any scrutiny of the development of this law from its first proposal by the Law 
Commission in 1996 to the form in which it was finally enacted reveals a consistent 
emasculation of its potential to pierce the corporate veil (Tombs and Whyte 2003), 
culminating in the explicit removal of any personal liability for directors. Thus, the 
likely impact of the Act needs to be considered in the government’s own Regulatory 
Impact Assessment, which projected that the Act will not generate more than 10–13 
successful prosecutions per annum (Home Office 2006). Third, it should also be 
emphasized that here we are dealing with the most egregious consequences of risks that 
cross the ‘factory fence’. As Almond himself puts it:
The enforcement of work related fatality cases has become an increasingly high-profile issue in the 
United Kingdom in recent years, due to the influence of a number of major transport disasters upon 
the consciousness of policy-makers and the public . . .. (Almond 2007: 285)
This shift in focus from workers to the general public is partly a crossing of a class 
divide—from workers exchanging their labour power for a wage to middle-class, 
suburban commuters paying significant sums for season tickets (Pearce and Tombs 
1997)—with all that entails in the context of dominant constructions of the ‘ideal victim’ 
(Whyte 2007a).
Now, there are clear differences in what regulation is, ought to be and can be, between 
each of the views we have discussed in this section. But, at the same time, there are 
fundamental similarities—and, in the terrain they traverse, we can see the scope of a 
regulatory received wisdom.7 each can be understood as advocating a form of voluntarism: 
they assume that offending on the part of the regulated is relatively marginal and 
aberrant rather than widespread and routine—so that the majority of corporations for 
the majority of the time comply with law voluntarily, either on the basis of some form of 
enlightened self-interest or through some essentially moral commitment to doing what 
is right simply because it is right. Since offending is marginal and aberrant, they advocate 
a voluntarism, as regulation can be most effective when it singles out and targets the 
small minority of troublesome firms in need of external regulation.
yet, in our view, the dominant influence of these positions has been achieved as a 
result of the political convenience of the prescribed approach, rather than in the light 
of any empirical evidence supporting its likely success. Crucially, voluntarism is supported 
by a hegemonic view of regulation that rests upon a very particular set of assumptions 
about the nature of the social order, for it supports a ‘consensus’ (Whyte 2004) or 
‘co-operative’ (Snider 1990) model of regulation, in which a series of fundamental, 
pluralist commitments are shared. This model is based upon the idea that power in 
modern social orders is dispersed rather than concentrated, that a variety of interests 
can be mobilized to influence the formal political agenda, and that social change, 
through mobilization of those interests, is possible (see Pearce 1976: 38–41).
It is important, further, to recognize the mutual compatibility of this pluralist position 
with neo-liberalism. Consensus or cooperative models of regulation, on the one hand, 
7 None of this is to claim that such views exhaust the spectrum of academic views on regulation. Far from it: thus, for example, 
work in the United Kingdom by Croall, Fooks, Tombs and Whyte and, in North America, by Pearce, Snider, Glasbeek and Tucker, 
to name but a few, has developed a quite different perspective upon regulation, central to which is the view that this is an outcome 
and object of struggle between essentially antagonistic social forces. The point that is being made here is that the views referred to 
in the paper are dominant and, as we shall argue, and relatedly, cohere closely and indeed have informed governmental policies 
towards regulation.
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and neo-liberal political economy, on the other hand, are each reducible to the view 
that a mutually beneficial co-incidence of interests amongst apparently antagonistic 
parties can be reached via relatively little or no state intervention. Thus, whether 
consciously or not, both consensual/cooperative models of regulation and neo-liberal 
approaches to regulation provide a closely coherent theoretical justification for currently 
dominant strategies of regulation. And, in these claims, the model coheres perfectly 
with the view of the world enshrined in the Robens philosophy and institutionalized in 
the UK system of safety regulation. In so far as common interest theory provides common 
ground between apparently disparate consensus/cooperative and neo-liberal 
perspectives, then, it remains the theoretical fulcrum of the dominant approach to 
business regulation in Western liberal democracies.
Put simply, self-regulation is necessarily vulnerable to regulatory degradation: if 
government withdraws from regulatory enforcement—making it less likely that 
workplaces will be inspected, less likely that inspections will result in enforcement, less 
likely the enforcement is of the more rather than less punitive type—and in the absence 
of countervailing power of trades union within and beyond workplaces, then regulation 
becomes increasingly reliant upon market-based mechanisms.
In the remainder of this paper, we consider the policies towards regulation and 
enforcement developed under recent, successive Labour governments and, in particular, 
focus upon how those governments have presided over a crucial period of consolidation 
for a ‘burdens on business’/‘anti-red tape’ agenda. Through these initiatives has 
emerged a system of occupational safety regulation that relies increasingly upon market 
forces rather than the process of law enforcement as a form of regulatory control.
Revitalizing Market-Based Regulation
An early indication of New Labour’s enthusiasm for market-based regulation came in 
1997 when the position of the Conservative’s flagship Deregulation Unit was consolidated 
under a new name, the ‘Better Regulation Unit’, with the Better Regulation Task Force 
established in the Cabinet Office. Regulatory impact assessments (RIAs) were introduced 
the following year. In 1999, the role of the Better Regulation Unit (renamed the 
Regulatory Impact Unit) was extended with a remit to ensure that RIAs were being 
implemented across government departments. RIAs aim to measure the costs and 
benefits of reforms on business, consumers, third-sector organizations and public 
authorities of all proposed policy and legislative reforms. yet, they contain structural 
biases towards less rather than more regulation in at least two ways. First, their very 
rationale is the need to consider ‘the impact of any new regulations, before introducing 
them, to ensure any regulatory burden they add is kept to a minimum’;8 second, their 
economic form is likely to produce a financial argument for less rather than more 
regulation, since the costs of meeting new regulatory requirements on the part of 
businesses are generally more calculable than are the economic or social benefits of 
such regulation (Cutler and James 1996). Thus, their emergence and inclusion at the 
heart of the government’s burdens on business/anti-red tape agenda are a clear 
indication that a key function of RIAs in practice has been to pre-empt and minimize 
8 Scrutinising New Regulations, at www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/bre/policy/scrutinising-new-regulations/page44076.html.
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legislative and regulatory cost impacts upon business by formalizing a business-sensitive 
cost–benefit analysis in the legislative process.
In terms of health and safety policy, a key shift towards market-based regulation came 
with the publication of Revitalising Health and Safety (Health and Safety Commission and 
Department of the environment, Transport and the Regions 2000; henceforth RHS), a 
new regulatory strategy launched jointly by the government and the Health and Safety 
Commission (HSC) in June 2000, with 10-year targets for major reductions in injuries 
and ill health caused by work. It is clear from RHS that the overwhelming focus is upon 
developing partnership rather than enforcement, and is consistent with Robens-style 
common interest assumptions: RHS is based upon the idea that health and safety practice 
is best achieved by appealing to the good will of employers; only when this good will fails 
should law enforcement be considered.
Organized around 44 ‘Action Points’, the strategy prioritizes the motivation of 
employers by explaining the benefits to industry of a good health and safety regime, 
while at the same time noting the need to ‘legislate to make the punishment fit the 
crime’ when ‘health and safety standards are flagrantly ignored’. In other words, 
enforcement should only be brought into play after encouragement and education have 
failed. This approach has been famously characterized by Braithwaite in terms of the 
need for regulators to ‘walk softly but carry a big stick’. The problem is that when this 
principle is applied in practice, compliance styles of regulation typically endorse walking 
softly; the carrying of big sticks is generally discouraged. This much is clear in the RHS 
strategy, which observes that ‘while appropriate enforcement and deterrence is crucial, 
this must not be at the expense of promoting voluntary compliance and models of 
excellence. The government wishes to build on 25 years of successful partnership 
between employers, employees, trade unions and consumers’. What is important here is 
that although there is a recognition that enforcement of the law has a place in the 
regulatory system, it is set against its notional opposite: ‘partnership’; and enforcement 
is conceptualized as something that might compromise ‘partnership’. A partnership based 
upon ‘education’ and ‘encouragement’ is therefore positioned in opposition to law 
enforcement. In practice, compliance styles of regulation pose a choice between walking 
softly or carrying a big stick, with the latter featuring always as a resort of the very last 
option.
In effect, RHS, for all its talk of enforcement and the punishment fitting the crime, 
represented a significant shift closer to a market-based system of regulation. It was the 
first significant policy document to formally establish a ‘risk-based’ approach to health 
and safety—an approach that relied upon businesses themselves weighing up the costs 
and benefits of good health and safety management. This is essentially the effect of the 
‘ready reckoner’ that is proposed as Action Point 1 in the document—a tool that is 
available online as a method of deriving actuarial calculations used in the insurance 
industry. In so far as this tool relies solely upon an economic methodology to achieve 
legal compliance (rather than a moral or legal case), it is based upon a technique of 
market-based regulation in the purest sense.
Other proposals for market-based regulation in RHS include: involving the insurance 
industry more closely in the work of the HSC (mechanisms that bring actuarial markets 
into play); a clients’ charter to encourage contractors in the construction industry to 
improve working practices (linking safety improvements to economic competitiveness); 
the better education of workers, consumers and businesses in concepts of risk 
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management (reducing safety management to the way individuals are equipped to 
manage particular ‘risks’); and the introduction of a new government grant scheme to 
encourage investment by small firms in health and safety management (using economic 
incentives directly to enhance compliance). RHS did include some proposals that cannot 
be simply considered as encouraging ‘market-regulation’, such as new proposals on 
enforcement (see below), training for safety representatives and a focus on the health 
and safety responsibilities of the public sector. But, taken together, the proposals in the 
Action Plan strongly emphasize market-based solutions and incentives to business, as 
opposed to strengthening the regulatory role of workers or state regulatory agencies.
Perhaps the greatest prospect of a shift towards more innovative use of enforcement 
is summed up in Action Points 7 and 8 of RHS. The former dealt with extending the 
application of prison sentences and the latter with new ‘name and shame’ provisions. 
Despite the apparent promise of those measures, it is significant that, on one hand, they 
constitute fairly minor and peripheral aspects of the strategy and, on the other, are 
hardly supported by clear political will. The latter point is confirmed by a subsequent 
review of regulatory penalties published in November 2006, Regulatory Justice: Making 
Sanctions Effective (McRory 2006), which, despite some of the punitive rhetoric that 
accompanied its commissioning and subsequent publication, was framed by the 
assumption that whilst ‘Regulatory sanctions are an essential feature of a regulatory 
enforcement toolkit and are central to achieving compliance by signalling the threat of 
a punishment for firms that have offended . . . many regulators are heavily reliant on 
one tool, namely criminal prosecution, as the main sanction should industry or 
individuals be unwilling or unable to follow advice and comply with legal obligations .... 
The availability of other more flexible and risk based tools may result in achieving better 
regulatory outcomes’ (McRory 2006: 3). The conclusion of the McRory report was the 
highly questionable assumption that regulators over-rely upon prosecution. Now, this 
simplification masks the complexities and differences that we find in different regulatory 
agencies (the McRory report considered 650 regulatory bodies within the scope of its 
review). Moreover, it is a simplification that, as we will see later in this paper, can hardly 
be applied without qualification to the Health and Safety executive (Tombs and Whyte 
2007; 2008).
Added to this, we find in McRory a regulatory defeatism that eshews any call for 
added resources for enforcement and prosecution. The likely result is therefore that 
the cheaper options offered by McRory will replace more costly forms of enforcement. 
For those reasons, the McRory report effectively supported measures that are, in the 
context of the wider Hampton Review, likely to further sideline the role of court 
prosecutions. Thus, this review proposed a new system of pre-court orders (‘Statutory 
Notices’) aimed at diverting cases from prosecution and a new system of on-the-spot 
fixed fines (‘Monetary Administrative Penalties’) in addition to providing the courts 
with new sentencing options (‘Corporate Rehabilitation Orders’ and ‘Publicity Orders’). 
The latter proposals may yet prove to be significant, but the likely effect is that they will 
shift the courts further towards relying upon market mechanisms. Those publicity orders 
rely upon a secondary impact: namely that shaming provisions provoke a market reaction 
that causes the company to suffer commercially as a result of bad publicity.
In sum, then, the concept of risk established in RHS provides support to a system of 
market-based regulation or self-regulation in which compliance is secured as a result of 
appeals to good business sense. The consolidation of market/risk-based approaches to 
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regulation in the Hampton/McRory reviews has certainly occurred at the expense of 
‘strict enforcement’ and prosecution.
The ‘Burdens on Business’ Agenda
This general shift away from enforcement has undoubtedly had a profound impact on 
the work of the Health and Safety executive for some time. Thus, for example, the 
growth in activity on stress at work is almost entirely focused upon promoting awareness 
and educating employers, as opposed to developing enforcement mechanisms or 
tightening up law in this area. This approach was secured by the business lobby’s 
successful prevention of legal reform on workplace stress early in the first Labour term 
of office (Hazards, 63, July–September 1998). A similar focus on education in other HSe 
priorities such as the Musculoskeletal and Disease Reduction Programmes has 
consistently emphasized advice and education rather than enforcement.
But it was not until Labour’s second period of office that the extent of New Labour’s 
long-term plans for a reconstructed system of business regulation became fully apparent.9 
The crucial moment came in March 2004, when the Treasury, under Gordon Brown, 
established the Hampton Review, to ‘consider the scope for reducing administrative 
burdens on business by promoting more efficient approaches to regulatory inspection 
and enforcement without reducing regulatory outcomes’ (Hampton 2005). The 
report—published a year later and tellingly entitled Reducing Administrative Burdens: 
Effective Inspection and Enforcement—called for more focused inspections, greater emphasis 
on advice and education and, in general, for removing the ‘burden’ of inspection from 
most premises. Specifically, Hampton called for the reduction of inspections by up to a 
third—across all regulatory agencies, this would equate to one million fewer inspections—
and instead recommended that regulators make much more ‘use of advice’ to business. 
The basis of the Hampton Agenda was thereby laid—an agenda based upon the use of 
pseudo-scientific, risk-based claims to withdraw regulatory scrutiny from those that, in 
the terms used in the Hampton report, had ‘earned’ their ‘autonomy’. This agenda 
itself was based upon a series of underlying commitments: that most businesses are law-
abiding, likely to comply when faced with a combination of persuasion and market 
incentives, and that only the minority of recalcitrant businesses need to be monitored 
via inspection regimes. Such assumptions regarding business offending and offenders 
enable the Hampton report to endorse enthusiastically twin-track regulation, whereby 
regulatory interventions are ‘targeted at the worst offenders’.
Then, in March 2005, the Cabinet Office’s Better Regulation Task Force published its 
review of regulation, Less Is More: Reducing Burdens, Improving Outcomes (2005). This 
document proposed a crude mechanism for controlling the regulatory ‘burden’: a ‘one 
in, one out’ approach to regulation, whereby all new regulations were to be accompanied 
by the withdrawal of existing regulations.
The recommendations of these reports came together in the Legislative and Regulatory 
Reform Act, which passed into law in November 2006. The aim of the law is to ‘enable 
delivery of swift and efficient regulatory reform to cut red tape’ (Cabinet Office 2006). 
The Act itself therefore is framed by ‘burdens on business’ rhetoric—a rhetoric that 
9 For example, in November 2003, the government finally abandoned its long-proposed and much trumpeted ‘Safety Bill’ 
(Hazards, 89, January–March 2005).
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juxtaposes economic health and success as a counter-balance to over-bearing investigation 
and enforcement.
The Hampton reforms have at their heart a very carefully constructed rationale that 
defines regulation first and foremost in terms of its economic burden on business. Thus, 
s. 1 of the Act creates a remarkable new power for a Minister of the Crown to make 
an order that removes from government a ‘regulatory burden’, defined in the Act 
as a ‘financial cost’, an ‘administrative inconvenience’ or ‘an obstacle to efficiency, 
productivity or profitability’. There is a very unashamed and open honesty about the 
language being used here; we now find in legislation and in policy a very open admission 
that there is a direct relationship between the shift towards self-regulation and a neo-
liberal profit-maximizing agenda.
The explicit economic rationale at the heart of the Hampton reforms reached their 
high point in the new Regulators Compliance Code,10 published in December 2007, by the 
newly formed Department for Business, enterprise and Regulatory Reform, the creation 
of this tellingly named Department being one of Gordon Brown’s first initiatives when 
he finally made it to Number 10 in the summer of 2007. This Regulatory Code was 
introduced to address how ‘the few businesses’ (Para. 8) that break the law should be 
handled. In general, regulators, including the HSe, were advised: ‘By facilitating 
compliance through a positive and proactive approach, regulators can achieve higher 
compliance rates and reduce the need for reactive enforcement actions’ (Para. 8); they 
‘should seek to reward those regulated entities that have consistently achieved good 
levels of compliance through positive incentives, including lighter inspections and less 
onerous reporting requirements’ (Para. 8.1); they should also ‘take account of the 
circumstances of small regulated entities, including any difficulties they may have in 
achieving compliance’ (Para. 8.1). If the rationale for these new realities of regulation 
was not clear enough, the document formalized the emerging conflict of interest for 
regulatory bodies when it emphasized that ‘[r]egulators should recognise that a key 
element of their activity will be to allow, or even encourage, economic progress and only 
to intervene when there is a clear case for protection’ (Para. 3). Thus, the Hampton 
Review and the reforms that followed have extended the scope and reach of the burdens 
on business agenda directly into the day-to-day work of inspectors, further marginalizing 
the enforcement role of the HSe and giving renewed momentum to New Labour’s pro-
business trajectory.
The harmony of voices across business and government in the post-Hampton climate 
is remarkable. The triumphalist declaration of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform 
Act’s aim to ‘cut the burden of regulation and embed a light-touch, risk-based approach 
to regulation . . . to improve our status as one of the world’s most attractive places to do 
business . . .’ came not from the Institute of Directors (IoD) or the Confederation of 
British Industry (CBI), but from Cabinet Office Minister Jim Murphy (Cabinet Office 
2006). If government has promoted the Hampton Agenda with spurious references to 
global competitiveness, the IoD and the CBI had very specific targets in their sites. John 
Cridland, CBI Deputy Director-General, championed the Hampton Agenda because it 
‘seeks to bring about a lasting culture change in officials’ attitudes to risk and regulation, 
which is the real prize for business’ (Cabinet Office 2006). James Walsh, Head of 
Regulation at the IoD, welcomed government measures to ‘slash costly over-regulation 
10 See www.berr.gov.uk/files/file45019.pdf.
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. . . provided it is accompanied by the necessary culture change across Whitehall’ 
(Cabinet Office 2006).
Dangerous Times for Safety
Aside from receiving praise in the business world, perhaps the key effect of the ‘burdens 
on business’ agenda as it has gained momentum through this past decade has been to 
precipitate a major shift in the work of HSe. For example, in March 2004, a HSC internal 
document noted tellingly that ‘there has been deregulatory pressure from within 
government to reduce burdens on business . . . HSe has responded positively’.11 And, in 
July 2005, the HSC launched its own review of regulation under the rubric of ‘a debate 
on the causes of risk aversion in health and safety’; in its draft ‘simplification’ plans, 
published four months later, it outlined its strategy to follow to the letter the Hampton 
recommendations. In this document, HSC promised a ‘risk-based, targeted approach to 
enforcement’ that was to be supported by a 33 per cent reduction in inspections (HSC/e 
2005).
Prior to the emergence of the Hampton agenda—and long before the pressure on 
public sector resources brought on by government corporate welfare policies and bank 
bail-outs—HSe had begun to experience intense pressure on staffing numbers.12 This 
pressure can be pinpointed to the beginning of the second Blair government. In each 
of the years following 2001–02, the HSe began to face real-terms cuts in funding from 
the government’s grant-in-aid budget (see Figure 1).13 At its peak, in 1994, the number 
of HSe staff in post was 4,545. Since that time, numbers have fluctuated, but there has 
been a clear decline in the total number of staff employed by HSe since 2001–02. On 1 
April 2002, there were 4,282 staff in post and on 1 April 2008, there were 3,753 staff in 
post (a reduction of 12 per cent in the past six years).14 There were 1,508 frontline 
operational inspectors on 1 April 2003. By 1 April 2008, HSe had 1,33315 frontline 
operational inspectors (a 12 per cent reduction in the past five years). To put this figure 
into perspective, the number of frontline HSe inspectors equates to less than 9 per cent 
of the number of new police community support officers that the government set aside 
funding for between 2004 and 2008.
The steady erosion of HSe resources has certainly had an impact on the morale of the 
organization and its confidence to lobby government for the resources it needs. One 
indication of this lack of confidence is that the HSe has in recent years refrained from 
making any budgetary demands upon government, with the most senior HSe figures 
11 Health and Safety Commission (2004) ‘Becoming a Modern Regulator’, unpublished memo, March 2004, cited in Hazards, 91, 
August 2005, www.hazards.org/commissionimpossible/protectionracket.htm.
12 The same trend can also probably be identified in local authority enforcement teams, though the lack of published figures 
providing evidence of such trends makes it difficult to say this conclusively.
13 See HSe data supplied to the CCA, www.corporateaccountability.org/HSe/resources/table97to06.html.
14 One hundred and eighty staff were transferred from HSe to the new rail regulator, ORR, on 1 April 2006 (HSC 2006–07). The 
transfer of responsibilities from the HSe to the Pesticides Safety Division on 1 April 2008 involved the transfer of 174 staff (HSC 
Health and Safety Commission Annual Report & Health and Safety Commission/executive Accounts 2007/08). We have included 
354 ‘lost’ staff in this figure to allow longitudinal comparisons.
15 Ninety-five inspectors were transferred from HSe to the new rail regulator, ORR, on 1 April 2006 (Hansard, 15 January 2007, col. 
888W). The transfer of responsibilities from the HSe to the Pesticides Safety Division on 1 April 2008 has no effect on this figure 
(HSC Health and Safety Commission Annual Report & Health and Safety Commission/executive Accounts 2007/08). We have 
included 95 ‘lost’ inspectors in our calculations to allow for comparisons to be made across time.
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Fig. 1  HSe prosecutions19
16 See, e.g. the exchange between Geoffrey Podger, HSe chief executive, and Michael Jabez Foster, MP, at a sitting of the 
Department for Work and Pensions Select Committee, in May 2006, cited in CCA (2007).
17 House of Commons, Work and Pensions Committee, 2004, recommendation 9.
18 Mike Macdonald, negotiations officer with Prospect, cited at www.hazards.org/enforcement/whodoeshseprotect.htm.
19 Source: HSe published enforcement statistics, available at www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/enforce/index.htm, downloaded 17 
February 2009; 2007/08 figures are provisional.
prepared to assert that no extra resources are needed to ‘do the job’.16 It is both a 
measure of its own demoralization and confirmation by the HSe’s own assessment (no 
matter how misguided) that to argue for increased resources from the current 
government is futile. It is hardly a view shared by Prospect, the union that represents 
frontline inspectors. Back in 2004, Prospect recommended to the Department for Work 
and Pensions Select Committee that the numbers of field inspectors should be 
doubled—a proposal that the Committee endorsed;17 thus, last year, Prospect claimed 
that the HSe ‘cannot meet its public expectations to advise, inspect and enforce 
workplace health and safety’.18
The position adopted by senior management at the HSe appears even more 
remarkable in the context of wider debates on police funding. It is difficult to imagine 
any senior police officer in any police force area in the country relinquishing a claim to 
more officers or a larger budget—despite the fact that numbers of police officers are at 
an all-time high. Indeed, a plea for greater resources is almost a sine qua non of 
organizations.
Such a combination of political and resource pressures is likely to have a measurable 
impact upon the work of the HSe. However, we need not conceive of these effects 
working mechanistically, since to do so is both simplistic whilst also undermining the 
integrity and efforts of men and women on the ground who work within the organization. 
Rather, such pressures create a series of new realities within which regulators have to 
operate and which, in a sense, have to be translated into a way of doing what they are 
charged with doing.
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Insight here is provided by the work of a key compliance theorist, Keith Hawkins. In a 
typically rich ethnography, based upon extensive access to HSe, Hawkins (2002) has 
examined prosecutorial decision making in HSe, placing such decisions into ‘their broad 
environment and particular contexts’ (Hawkins 2002: 47). His analysis is revealing beyond 
this specific key regulatory moment of deciding whether or not prosecute, the latter being 
simply the moment where we find in sharpest focus the decision-making processes, and 
their contexts, within which regulators operate. For Hawkins, these contexts are understood 
through the concepts of ‘surrounds’, ‘fields’ and ‘frames’, where: ‘surround’ refers to the 
broad economic, political and social settings within which organizations, including legal 
organizations, do their work—and, here, the vulnerability of the HSe to changes in this 
broader surround is noted (Hawkins 2002: 48–9); an organizational ‘field’—ideas as to 
how the organization should pursue its ends—ranges from the formal (the organizational 
mandate, internal policy documents) to the informal (assumptions and expectations of 
staff at various levels); and ‘frame’ helps to describe how features in a particular problem 
or case are understood, placed and accorded relevance—frames are, according to 
Hawkins, ‘reflexive in the sense that they both constitute “reality” and selectively identify 
the facts that sustain a social reality’ (Hawkins 2002: 53). Through these concepts and 
their interaction, Hawkins seeks to understand regulatory decision making in a way that 
integrates micro-level interactions, the construction and maintenance of meso-level 
organizational realities and a macro-level political economy.
The period in which Hawkins undertook his work, and that covered by this paper 
also—that is, prior to the recent economic collapse and a generalized questioning of 
business activities—was one in which business interests—by definition, sectional 
interests—were widely represented as ‘general’ or ‘national’ interests (Whyte 2007b). 
This high point in the ‘moral capital of capital’ (Tombs 2007) and its deepening 
significance across all aspects of economic, political and social life must, utilizing 
Hawkins’ own concepts and analyses, have impinged significantly upon inspectors’ 
decisions to prosecute or not: ‘. . . [t]he inspector is by no means immune to the broader 
political and economic pressures and constraints affecting regulatory agencies, even 
though they may not be taken up as a matter of agency policy. The former forces exist 
in a consciousness of broad climates of opinion about regulation and punishment or 
public expectation . . .’ (Tombs 2007: 308). yet, if these aspects of wider political economy 
are virtually ignored by Hawkins (save for cursory discussion, see Tombs 2007: 117–19), 
it is precisely such meso and macro-level factors that are the focus of this paper and 
which, in our view, are central to understanding the nature, level and outcomes of 
regulation. If, then, as in previous work, Hawkins remains within his naturalistic 
paradigm (and thus ends up re-presenting the world he should be describing and 
analysing as a social scientists almost exclusively through the views and practices of its 
central participants, namely regulators), it is possible to utilize elements of his analytical 
framework without ending up in a simplistic validation of what even then were highly 
conservative, if understandable, prosecutorial practices:
. . . [t]he nature of the work is characterized by a constant preoccupation with practical solutions to imme-
diate and concrete problems. Inspectors are involved in face-to-face encounters with those whom they regu-
late; they have to deal with particular problems and precise issues, and compliance itself (or at least what 
an inspector may decide as an acceptable degree and kind of compliance) usually demands the expendi-
ture of time and money. This leads to compliance acquiring a negotiated character. (Tombs 2007: 198)
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The combination of individually negotiated solutions to a series of very pressing 
problems within an altered, and increasingly restrictive, set of political realities is likely 
to have very real effects. And, indeed, political and resource pressures are having a 
measurable impact upon the work of the HSe as a whole. Figures released recently 
following a Freedom of Information request to the HSe by Hazards Magazine show how, 
in the Field Operations Directorate, the largest division of the HSe, there was a 26 per 
cent fall in inspections and a 19 per cent fall in regulatory contacts between 2002–03 
and 2004–05. More recent research reveals a yet more dramatic collapse in regulatory 
activity over a longer period of time. This research shows that investigations of major 
injuries fell by 43 per cent between 2001/02 and 2006/07. In 2006/07, HSe investigated 
only a third of the number of over three-day injuries they investigated in 2001/02 and 
only a quarter of major injuries to members of the public that they investigated in 
2001/02 (UNITe/CCA 2008).
It is clear, then, that in the early 2000s, the HSe found itself under pressure as a result 
of the government’s burdens on business agenda. This culminated not only in the shift 
away from inspection and investigation, but in wholesale cuts in resources that have 
resulted in substantial reductions in staffing levels. This is the political context within 
which we can appreciate the reduction in inspections and changes in the form of 
regulatory intervention—features of the regulatory climate that the next section of the 
paper addresses in more detail.
The New Realities of Regulatory Enforcement
There is no claim being made here that an exact causal relationship between the 
fluctuations in enforcement policy and particular political decisions or events can be 
projected. However, conclusions can be drawn from the general patterns that can be 
observed across enforcement data; and these are patterns only explicable in the context 
of the unfolding political strategy outlined above. We have already noted that there are 
clear signs of a general decrease in HSe resources and frontline inspector numbers in 
particular around 2002–03, as well as a downturn in inspection and particular forms of 
regulatory activity since 2002–03. Figure 1 indicates two clearly differentiated periods of 
decline in prosecution, following an initial rise in the period after the election of the 
first Labour government. The first occurred roughly between 1999–2000 and 2003–04 
(a 16 per cent fall) and the second was a sharper decline between 2003–04 and 2005–06 
(a 38 per cent fall).
The data on enforcement notices, indicated by Figure 2, appear to tell a slightly 
different story. The steady rise in the number of notices reaches a peak in 2002–03 and 
then begins to fall back to a point roughly around 1996–97 levels. We can therefore 
make an interesting observation about the data that have been examined so far: that 
while enforcement notices are at roughly the same levels as they were when Labour 
came to power, prosecutions have collapsed. Indeed, between the high point in 1999/00 
and 2007/08, HSe prosecutions have halved. Trends in enforcement notices are rather 
more volatile.
Trends in enforcement notices rise by 33 per cent between 1997/98 and 2002/03, 
before exhibiting a steep decline of 42 per cent between 2002/03 and 2007/08. 
Prosecution rates in the same period exhibit a slight rise between 1997/98 and 2002/03, 
before exhibiting a comparable decline (of 38 per cent) between 2002/03 and 2007/08. 
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We can surmise, then, that all forms of enforcement action began a collapse at the 
beginning of New Labour’s second period in office, just as the burdens on business 
agenda were coming to fruition.
If we contrast the different patterns revealed by trends in improvement notices and 
prohibition notices, we can discern a slight difference between those forms of 
enforcement action. There appears to have been a sharp increase in the use of 
improvement notices from the beginning of the first Labour government to the 
beginning of the second (an increase of 46 per cent between 1997/98 and 2002/03). 
The use of prohibition notices does not exhibit the same steep rise in 1997/98, but 
remains constant for five years or so. There follows a slight rise from 2001/02, and then 
a four-year decline, before the trend appears to stabilize at a relatively low rate in the 
past couple of years. The data on prohibition notices reveal it to be a more stable form 
of enforcement action than prosecutions or improvement notices, albeit one that has 
declined substantially since 1997/08.
Improvement notices, despite appearing to be the most volatile form of enforcement 
action, have actually risen by 2 per cent since 1997/98. This compares to a 29 per cent 
decline in prohibition notices and a 37 per cent decline in prosecutions in the same 
period.
The slowing of the rate of prohibition notices issued, as shown in Figure 3, may 
therefore indicate a tendency to use such notices (even in a less enforcement-minded 
context) in place of prosecutions. A frontline HSe inspector in personal correspondence 
brought our attention to this tendency. This inspector, unsurprised by findings reported 
in an earlier paper (Tombs and Whyte 2008: 10), noted that, in the current period, 
‘being a good thief taker counts for nothing’ (Tombs and Whyte 2008). That is, where 
pressure on resources is intensifying, and where there is a political mood against the use 
of prosecutions, it may be increasingly difficult for frontline inspectors to justify the 
reasons for, and the costs entailed in, taking a prosecution. Rather less resource-intensive, 
Fig. 2  HSe enforcement notices20
20 Source: ibid.
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and less politically difficult, is the option of a prohibition notice rather than a prosecution. 
This would account for the decline in prohibition notices being less marked than that 
for prosecutions.
Somewhat differently, trends in the period under scrutiny suggest that improvement 
notices have been a more durable enforcement option in comparison to both 
prosecutions and prohibition notices. This may well reflect the dominant assumptions 
underpinning pluralist/consensus approaches to securing compliance: because 
improvement notices do not impose an immediate cessation of work, unlike prohibition 
notices, nor are they likely to lead to criminal prosecution, these offer a more conciliatory 
and less antagonistic option for HSe inspectors when uncovering breaches or potential 
breaches of the law—a more consensual than adversarial option. Indeed, improvement 
notices, because they provide an opportunity to remedy the breach before more punitive 
action is taken, provide duty holders with an opportunity to show inspectors their 
willingness and preparedness to self-regulate (even though their preparedness in this 
respect may have been tarnished by the breach in the first place!). Improvement notices 
therefore constitute the type of enforcement option that is more consistent with the 
Hampton agenda. But, these points being made, we find that improvement notices—
the most commonly used formal enforcement response by inspectors—have, if we 
return briefly to Figure 3, fallen by 44 per cent between 2002/03 and 2007/08. In 
comparative terms, improvement notices have fallen more steeply than prosecutions or 
prohibition notices in this period.
When considered together with the prosecution data, these figures indicate that 
improvement notices—a more discretionary form of enforcement action than 
prohibition notices—have been equally vulnerable to New Labour’s burdens on business 
Fig. 3  HSe prohibition and improvement notices21
21 Source: ibid.
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policies. What this indicates is that the current political climate has undermined both 
prosecution and less adversarial forms of enforcement at the same time. This is significant, 
since it provides evidence that compliance approaches, rather than simply under-writing 
discretionary enforcement decisions, are more likely to lead directly to a regulatory 
degradation in which expediency, or the political and/or resource consequences of 
enforcement decisions, is the key influence upon regulatory decision making. A climate 
that has undermined the social and moral credibility of enforcement has produced a 
process of regulatory degradation in which there has been a collapse in prosecutions 
and in the use of more discretionary, ‘light touch’ responses to safety crimes.
Conclusions and Discussion
Seeking to ‘advance the debate concerning the most appropriate forms of OHS regulation 
for the twenty-first century’, Gunningham and Johnstone (1999: 11) have noted that 
although there is little evidence that the elements of self-regulation strategies actually 
work, then the same could be said for more punitive-based strategies. But, this conclusion 
is a difficult one to sustain, since experiments in more punitive approaches are rarely, if 
ever, proposed and, if they are, are not adopted by policy makers. More fundamentally, 
one might turn Gunningham and Johnstone’s point around—rather than there being of 
a lack of knowledge regarding the success of forms of self-regulation, the continual toll of 
workplace death, injury and disease clearly indicates their consistent failure, given that self-
regulation as a broad term encompasses dominant regulatory approaches across a whole 
swathe of states, notably Australia, North America and the United Kingdom.
Indeed, we might describe this approach as reckless and highly risky in itself given 
that lighter-touch regulation is likely to impact profoundly not only on patterns of 
compliance, but on the ability of regulators to know whether compliance is indeed being 
secured or not—such knowledge being central to the ‘risk-based’ decision-making 
process that allows companies to earn autonomy, and thus exemption from external 
intervention: put simply, how are regulators to know about company performance if the 
latter are left to self-regulate, and thus able to distort or withhold evidence of non-
compliance/poor performance from regulators? Thus, there is a great deal in these 
arguments that needs to be taken on trust. We do not deny value in thinking seriously 
about developing ‘risk’ factors per se, since, clearly, there are indicators that can indicate 
the likelihood of offending—for example, worker participation and active trade union 
membership are consistently linked to good health and safety performance. But, in the 
current climate, risk-based approaches have been translated as market-based approaches, 
which, in effect, has meant a shift further towards self-regulation and wholesale 
regulatory disengagement from large numbers of firms. Because all regulators have to 
do is allocate resources to investigating the worst offenders, the assumption is that other 
forms of ‘reflexive’ and ‘voluntarist’ market-based regulation will do the job of regulating 
the ‘good corporate citizen’.
HSe, then, has at best failed to resist the imposition of a twin-track regulatory agenda, 
with its emphasis upon targeting the worst performers, and the wider context of 
deregulation within which this has circulated. Its acquiescence to the Hampton agenda 
has never been in question. In March 2004, a HSC internal document noted that ‘there 
has been deregulatory pressure from within government to reduce burdens on business 
. . . HSe has responded positively’ (Hazards 2004).
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Through such positions, HSe is unwittingly exposing at best the vulnerabilities, at 
worst the contradictions, that lay at the heart of a Robens model of self-regulation, 
based upon a compliance-seeking enforcement style. HSe’s conceding to policies of 
neo-liberalism, as well as key tenets of its ideology, such as any external regulation 
constituting a burden, has so ideologically and materially undermined its enforcement 
capacity that it is now, we would submit and have argued at length elsewhere (Tombs 
and Whyte 2007; 2008), unable to fulfil what it is tasked to do and maintain a credible 
threat of enforcement. In this context, then, the enthusiastic embracing of a targeted 
enforcement policy, legitimated by risk-talk, which conjures of claims to scientificity 
(Tombs and Whyte 2006), is in fact a necessary pragmatism—for it is the only legitimate 
post-Hampton discourse which will allow the HSE to represent itself as fit for purpose. yet, what it 
means in effect is that the vast majority of workers in the vast majority of workplaces are 
subject to a form of regulation that has been degraded by the market. Self-regulation 
merges with compliance-oriented enforcement merges with neo-liberalism.
The consequences of this process could hardly be clearer. It is certainly no exaggeration 
to describe the trends alluded to in this paper as a collapse of enforcement. Investigations 
and inspections have fallen at an unprecedented rate as political and resource pressures 
have taken their toll on the day-to-day work of the inspectorate: the percentage falls in 
enforcement activities, already from low absolute levels, can hardly be described as 
anything other than a collapse. The extent of this decline would simply not be sustainable 
in most other areas of law enforcement—imagine the efforts of a Chief Constable, for 
example, to defend declines in investigations of violent interpersonal assault, or falls in 
prosecutions of apprehended burglars, where these certainly would be represented as 
collapses in enforcement, which, no doubt, would prove cause a political furore.
By contrast, it remains to be stated that the trends described in this paper have 
generated no political or popular outcry. Indeed, one function of the collapse in 
enforcement is that safety crimes may be subject to a process of decriminalization that 
renders them less visible in the public eye. But, if the collapse in enforcement has failed 
to attract any meaningful public attention, it is noticed by some: for it is sending a clear, 
calculated message to corporate criminals that, under Labour, they will be even freer to 
kill and injure with impunity. This does not mean that the trends described in this paper 
will see more workers killed or injured. Increased harm may indeed be a product of such 
trends, yet one would need a longer-term analysis in order to consider this, and, in any 
case, occupational injury data, even fatality data (Tombs 1999), are so flawed that it is 
virtually useless for any such analysis. But, there can be no doubt that the trends we are 
describing here are trends that institutionalize impunity in the sense that inflicting death 
and injury is less and less likely to result in investigation, or provoke any form of 
enforcement response, let alone prosecution—even in comparison to previously very 
low levels.
Nor, to return to where this paper began, could the messages herein be rolled out at a 
more difficult time. For, in the midst of recession, public and political attention focuses 
more on the need to keep people in work, less on the conditions of that work. As employers 
cut back on basic maintenance, training, replacement of hardware and software, and as 
work is intensified in general, it is little wonder that recessions kill and injure, as our recent 
experience testifies: between 1981 and 1985, for example, fatal and major injury rates 
increased across British manufacturing by 31 per cent and in construction by 45 per cent 
(Tombs 1990). And these effects were felt at a time when, arguably, the other key partner 
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in the formal tripartite nature of the Robens regulatory structure, organized labour, were 
better laved to resist attacks on safety protection than is the case now (Tombs 1996), thus 
rendering the contemporary role of external enforcement even more significant. 
Meanwhile, a response of governments increasingly cash-strapped after unprecedented 
levels of corporate welfare is likely to be two-fold: first, as with all public sector funding, to 
further restrict resources for enforcement activities; and, second, to further undermine 
enforcement per se, seek as ‘burdens’ are removed from the entrepreneurial activity upon 
which all bets for economic recovery are placed. This pincer movement upon a system of 
safety regulation already in disrepair will undoubtedly produce further death, injury and 
misery for working men and women and members of the public.
yet, in these times, there is much for workers’ movements to struggle for as well as against. 
The financial crisis has perhaps fatally undermined the legitimacy of the neo-liberal 
regulatory settlement. Whilst, clearly, the financial climate is set to weaken workers’ 
organizations, to place economic pressures upon the trade union movement, and—through 
rising unemployment and downward wage pressures—is likely to heighten the disciplinary 
power of the state over workers, capitalist states are also at their most vulnerable.
Space has therefore been opened up for a challenge to the state on all fronts: for 
those who would further erode the administrative apparatuses of the state and open yet 
more public services to privatization; for those who see the public sector as the necessary 
victim of the corporate welfare that has come in the form of bank bail-outs; and for 
those who see state vulnerability as an opportunity for a political challenge to neo-
liberalism. If we follow the argument developed in this paper to its logical conclusion, 
the challenge to neo-liberalism must also contain a challenge to (consensus/cooperative) 
pluralism. The financial crisis may provide us with more opportunities than before to 
mount a challenge to the suicidal self-regulatory policies of the past, but such a challenge 
will count for little if it is not a challenge that recognizes that people are killed at work 
as a result of an antagonistic relationship that cannot be resolved by ‘partnerships’, 
negotiation or cooperation.
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